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Legislative Representation in the USSR
DA VID DR ESCHER

University of Kentucky
Introduction
The purpo se of thi s paper is to gain a better understanding of the concept of legislative representation in the Soviet Union. In order to accompli sh this, certain definitional obstacle s must be overcome.
The mo st basic term in need of definition is the word "legislatu re."
Nelson Pol sby defined legislatures as being:
" .. . assemblies whose members meet, deliberate, and
act collectively as formal equals. He says that legislatures are further distinguished by their standing as official rather than private bodies and by the fact that
their formal enactments are binding on the population
to which they are accountable and from whom their
legitimacy emanates." '
Michael Mezey defined a legislature as:
"a predominantly elected body of people that acts collectively and has the formal power but not necessarily
the exclusive power to enact Jaws that are binding on all
members of a specific geographic entity. " 2
Most scholars accept the assumption -that legislatures are instit utions
that are rooted in representation. 3 Representation may be performed
through a number of specific legislative roles that have been identifi ed.
These include: political recruitment, representing the views of constit uents
to nonlegislative elites in government, informing the public, bureaucratic
oversight, nation-building, and political integration and legitimizati on.•
Common to all these discussions of legislatures is the underlying
acceptance of the assumption that legislatures make laws and act on behalf
of their constituents . This activity of acting on behalf of a constit uency can
be referred to as representation.
Representation can take on several forms and may not involve precisely
the same activities under all circumstances. 5 Two of the more prominent
forms of representation are Burkean representation and Liberal representation.
Edmund Burke argued that representation was too important and
specialized a function to be left to the ordinary citizen . Legislative representatives were to be charged with directing society toward a normatively correct goal. This would require, according to Burke, a capacity for discernment
not possessed by most citizens. Representatives had to be willing to forego
short-term and local interests in exchange for long-term national interests. 6
The Liberal concept of representation rejected the argument that
legislators must move their societies toward some morally correct goal. For
the Liberal, representation was a way to serve the specific, immediate needs
of a particular constituency. Since resources were always scarcer than the
demand for them, conflict was bound to develop. By institutionalizing competition for these resources in the legislature, resources could be allocated
without threatening the system ,'
Robert Weissberg applied the concepts of Burkean and Liberal
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representation to the American Congressional context using the terms colJective and dyadic representation. 8 The research of Weissberg and Pitkin
should make the reader aware that dyadic, Liberal representation is not the
onlY legitimate form of representation available.
Past legislative research has tended to limit comparative study to
western political systems. 9 Consequently, eastern European legislatures
have gone largely unstudied. The discussions collected by Wahlke and
Eulau and Patterson ' 0 completely ignore Communist legislatures. In the
past, students of Communist political systems have tended to regard
legislatures as irrelevant to policymaking. 11 There is the general assumption
that these bodies are " ... mere parodies of deliberative bodies ... , "' 2 and
are hence unworthy of study.
It is my hypothesis that legislative representation does occur in the
Soviet Union. I will argue that representation in the Soviet Union is conceived
of as a more Burkean process than it is in the United States. I do not wish
to suggest that Soviet legislative representation is totally devoid of
Liberal overtones. In fact, I will argue that representation is at least partially
accomplished through constituency-service and oversight. In this paper, I
will present a justification for studying the Soviet legislative system, the
constitutional bases of Soviet legislative representation, and an examination
of constituency-service and legislative oversight of the bureaucracy.

I
If a legislature is to have the capability to represent its constituents, it
must be regarded as legitimate by those constituents. Without this sense of
legitimacy, citizens will not be able to perceive any of the attempts made by
legislators to perform the representative function.
Legislatures in Communist states have gone unstudied largely because
Westerners have considered these states to be totalitarian political systems that
offer their citizens few, if any, opportunities for political expression and
participation. The Soviet Union attempts to portray itself as a democratic
state, which should involve, at a minimum, the participation of the citizenry
in the political process.
In the West, citizen participation is traditionally measured (though not
exclusively measured) through the level of voter turnout during elections. I
believe that there is a sufficient amount of Soviet electoral data to suggest
that there are opportunities for political expression in the Soviet Union. The
opportunity for political expression may suggest that the citizenry has the
legitimate ability to present inputs to the larger political system. This, in
turn, would suggest that decision-making and policymaking in the Soviet
Union is not a monolithic process and that legislative bodies might serve
some function in it.
The 99.0% voter turnout level in the Soviet Union' 3 is obviously incorrect. The implications of these turnout statistics, which sometimes exceed
Gilison's 99.0% average, are simply unbelievable. If they were correct, in
1975
"only 27 Turkmens out of 1,156,848 failed to vote. In
Tadzhikistan the figure given is 65 out of 1.5 million
and in Kirgizhia 125 out of 1,639,808." 14
While the official figures are somewhat unbelievable, it would not be
unreasonable to suggest that legitimate voter turnout statistics would be
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higher in the Soviet Union than they ·would be in many Western state
There are almost no impediments to voting in the Soviet Uni on . A vot! ·
must merely meet the requirements of age and citizenship. The burden 0 }
registration is on the local soviet rather than the voter himself." Proximity
to polling stations is not a problem either since
"voters who expect to travel on election day may simp ly
apply for a 'certificate of the right to vote in anot her
place,' which they can present in any polling place in the
Soviet Union. In addition, hospitals with more than fifty
voters have polling stations, as do ships with twenty or
more vpters, long distance trains, and major air and rail
terminals.'" 6 •
The Soviet political system also makes extensive use of agitator s who
are charged with informing voters about the candidates and "getti ng out the
vote". 11 Additionally, "election day is decl;ued a holiday and is scheduled
for a Sunday ... since Sunday is a general day of rest in the USSR. ' ' 11 This
serves to further reduce the degree of inconvenience that voters ar e expected
to endure.
Soviet elections are not necessarily r:ubberstamp confirmati on s of candidates. Some voters do cast negative ballots q11doccasionally, local level
candidates are defeated. ' 9
Since Soviet elections are very convenient to participate in, and virtually
impossible to forget to participate in Gilison has suggested that those who
abstain from voting are engaging in a form of negative input, since these
elections are supposed to add to the reglme's legitimacy . 20
"the system demands active involvement, participati on
that gives visible evidence of one's loyalty ... (I)naction, purposeful noninvolvement, is just at dispicable as
negative action. " 21
The possibility that Soviet elections allow for some degree of political
expression does e.xist. If traditional conclusions concerning citizen participation in the Soviet political system as a whole are incorrect, it is possible
that traditional conclusion s concerning subsystems, such as the legislative
network, may also be incorrect.

II
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is the preeminent legislative body in
the Soviet Union. It is a bicameral body comprised of the Soviet of the
Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. 22 The Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet sits at its apex and is
'' ... elected from among the deputies and consists of
the chairman, fifteen Deputy Chairmen-one from each
union republic, the Secretary of the Presidium, an d
twenty-one members of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR. " 23
An integrated system of subordinate level soviets permeates the entire
nation, extending to the sublocal level. These lower level "Soviets of People' s Deputies" include:
"the Supreme Soviets of the union republics; the
Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics; the territorial and provincial Soviets of People's Deputies, the
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Soviets of People's Deputies of autonomous regions and
autonomous areas; district, city, (district) city-district,
settlement and village Soviets of People's Deputies ... " 24
According to the Constitution of the USSR, this system of soviets
represents the supreme power of the people of the USSR. 25 The Constitution of the USSR seems to suggest that representation is conceived to be a
Burkean process in the Soviet Union. Rather than making explicit reference
to serving the needs of individual citizens, the Constitution states:
"(t)he Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the
leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the
nucleus of its political system and of (all) state
organizations. The CPSU exists for the people and
serves the people.
Armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Communist
Party determines the general perspective of the development of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR,
directs the great creative activity of the Soviet people,
and imparts a planned and scientifically sound character
to their struggle for the victory of Communism . " 26
This passage from the Soviet Constitution indicates that the government of the Soviet Union is to be directed by the CPSU to achieve a specific
goal, the stage of Communism. V. I. Lenin argued in What is to be Done?
that the masses were incapable of discerning their own long-range interests,
and therefore required the direction of a vanguard party. 21 Both the Constitution of the USSR and Lenin's writings appear to be more supportive of
the Burkean concept of representation than the Liberal one, in that they
argue in favor of a goal that is presumably considered to be objectively correct and recognize that the average citizen may not be able to recognize what
must be done to attain this goal.
III
Part II of this paper indicates that the concept of representation is not
foreign to Soviet political thought. While the Soviet understanding of
representation may be different from the American understanding of
representation, the concept itself is legitimate .
Despite the Burkean nature of representation as it is presented in the
Constitution of the USSR and in the writings of Lenin, representative activity does take place in the Liberal sense of the word as well.
Constituency service does occur at the local level of Soviet government
and is an activity that is encouraged by the higher echelons of the government. Table 1 indicates the extent to which constituency service is considered important by the deputies of local soviets.
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Tulc 1
Pucy Sta1u ud Attk•des of Loni Dtp•tia toward U11eUttf•l ■est of Titdr Work
(pttt<■ I-)

Party Stauu
Party
Member

Party

No~

C..dld■tt

Al111iotio,,

In(

U1t.fal Alpedt of 0tp•11 Work

1969

1'71

1969

1971

1969

1971

1969

Work with the mandate of the vo<crs
Receivin1 voters, considerationorcomplaintsand proposals

16.7

16.l

ll .8

26.4

)) ,)

ll . 1

18.l

11,l

42.2

25,7

20.4

2) .0

26.l

28.4

2l .4

Preparation of questions for sessions of the Soviet

8.6

7.0

l .l

l .1

6.l

Preparation of questions ror the Sov iet's caecutive committee

8.4

8.7

l .l

l .0

6.l

22.l

18. 1

ll ,8

ll .7

lO.O

27,7

26.0

26,4

10.l

10.l

ll .7

-

9.4

6.7

8,0

10.0

10. 7

10..S

6.9

4 .◄

5.2

S.9

10.S

4.4

-4.0

7 .0
l .J

Wort with the staodin1 commiuions
Implementat ion in 1hc election distrid of decisions made by
the Soviet and iu executive committ ee

6.l
4.6

Verification of the fulrtllmentor aovemmcnt ruoh.uions and
decision s made by central and local ora.ans
A&itadon and propqanda wort ln the election district

16. 7

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Pcrcent11c or 1969or 1971sample accordi.nato Pan y status

56 .2

S0.2

t.2

1.6

0 .6

14.2

42 .0

ioo
lot.0

No«e: Table is basedon answcn to the ques1ion: "Which area of your activities as a dtputy do you considtr the most rru1trut1"Answer, 10the
same question are broken down by social Position (in the source below, pp. 168-69). by education (in the source, pp, llS-27), by aae (in the:
10u.rce, pp. 257- .S9), and by s;e:x(in the source, p, 281). In each case, the authors also provide a perce.nt11ebreakdownfor the entire S&mp&t{s)
.
Sou.rte: 8 . K. Alcksecvand M. N. Pcrfil'ev, Printsipy i tt ndartsii ra.cvitUo pndsto11 ittl 'no10 sosta'IO matnyklr so11tto11(Lcninlf&d: Lmildll:
1976), p. 202.
'
(From Lubranoti . al., 1911;.k)

In response to the question "Which area of your activities as a deputy
do you consider the most fruitful?" samples taken of local deput ies in both
1969 and 1971 indicated that considering the complaints and pro posals of
the voters was consistently ranked either first or second by all the categories
of deputies listed. In the same time period, all categories of deputies ranked
working with the mandate of the voters as either second or third in its
degree of usefulness. While it is difficult to determine what exact ly is meant
by the term "mandate of the voters", it does appear to be similar to considering the views of the voters.
One might raise the question of the validity of a survey undert aken in
the Soviet Union, given the potentially coercive role of the government.
While such a concern is legitimate, there does not appear to be any reason to
believe that the answers provided by the respondents of this survey were
given simply to please individuals at higher levels of the governme ntal and
Party structure. In fact, the low scores given to the usefulness of agitation
and propaganda work for virtually every category of respondent suggests
that the survey may indeed be legitimate.
As Friedgut noted, there appears to be a fair degree of reliance by the
government on agitators in election campaigns. 29 Evidently, the government
considers such activity to be desirable, and if this survey were intended to
provide support for official positions one would expect scores for the
usefulness of agitation and propaganda work to be higher.
There is also some theoretical basis that would support the legitimacy
of this survey. Merle Fainsod found that during the 1930s in Smolensk
Province, citizens routinely utilized the services of their provincial soviet in
order to have demands satisfied. 30
James Oliver found that in the cities of Leningrad and Mo scow,
citizens inundated the raion (borough) level soviets with demands. These
demands, like casework demands placed on American legislators, are of a
personal or individual nature and do not usually relate to matters of overall
government policy. 31
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Table 1
la Local So•l<u A«onllll1 to Sodal Polltloa
1............ 1
Soda! Polltlo ■

Worlltn
Hff

l)lllkollla Noted by Local O.,atla

Inadequateaencraleducation and culturallevel
weaknessof professionalpreparation
ranoranceor the basics of administrationand leaisJation

4.8

htelllpaula
1971

1969

4 .2

Eaploy ....
19'71

1969

0.2

1.4

2.0

s.o

0.2

0 .4

8.2

9.6

J.4

S.4

19'71

J .I
11.0

12.S

1.6

1.S

0.8

1.0

6.0

6.4

0 .4

0 .4

1.4

6.2

13.4

20.4

S.6

10.6

11.0

IS .1

IS.6

14.0

JI.I

36.2

24.6

9.4

7.2
8.4

4 .6
8.4

IJ .0
1.2

14.4

S.8

9.6
8.2

J .I
9.4

11.6

6.2

17.0

9.8

8.2

9.4

S.8

4.0

7.8

6.0

9.6

6.2

2.4

2.0

2.0

2.4

1.4

S.2

J.4

7.0

S.6

8.2

0.8

0.1

0.4

0.4

2 .6

l .4

2.2

1.8

1.0

1.4

J. I

2.0
100

1.6
100

0 .4

1.4

Tool

J .6
100

100

100

J.I
100

Pcrcentqe or 1969or 1971sample in eachsocial position

50.0

57.6

45.2

40.2

4 .8

2.2

Little life experience
AbsenCC
of or&ani.u.tional
skills
Litdce,xpcricnccin dcputorialactivities
overload in basic work
overload or social commi.uions
Rcrnotcnasof dcction district from residenceor from place or work
Limkad on of deputy riahu
Apathyor voters in the district
At,scnoe or proper informationon the status of businessin dcction
nei&hborhoods
, in enterprises,and institutions
Inattentiveness or separateuccutivc or1ans and officials to qucsiions
presentedto deputies
1nadcquatchelp in work from the standinacommissionsand
executivecommittees
(nadeq\lllc help in work from local Party, mass and independent
,oc:ialoraaniwions
constant help from local institutionsUl oraanizinathe work of deputies

IS .1

J .I

•White-oollarpersonnel($/wz}tashchic)

Note: Table is based on answersto the question: "What kindor difficultiesdo you find in your work?'' Answersto the same questionarc broken
downby partymembership(in the sourcebelow, pp. 204--205),by education(in the source, pp. 232-35}, by a,e (in the source, pp. 26'--67), and by
sex (ln the source, p. 283-M). In each cue, 1heauthorsaha providea percentagebreakdownfor the en1iresample(s).
Source: 8. K. AJebeev and M . N. Pcrnl'tv, Prilftsipy i tcndcntsil ra:vitiio pr«Js1ovi1el'no10 sostavo matnyklt sovctov (Leningrad: Lcnizdat,
19'76),pp. 170-71.
(from Lubranott . ol.; 52-B)

Table 2 also supports the hypothesis that constituency service is an important aspect of legislative representation in the USSR at the local level.
Table 2 indicates that with the exception of deputies who held the social
position of Employee in 1971 an overload in basic work was either the first
or second most frequently mentioned difficulty mentioned by deputies
across social positions in 1969 or 1971. In fact, with the exception of 1971
workers and employees, it was the most frequently mentioned complaint.
While "overload in basic work" is not a clearly defined term, I would
argue that a substantial amount of this basic work is probably concerned
with constitutent service. Oliver noted that when demands are not responded
to at one of the local levels, citizens often submit them to higher levels,
which in turn place pressure on the lower level to respond to the citizen demand. Acording to Oliver, 400Joof the raion level complaints are handled
after being submitted to a higher level. 33
The satisfaction of these demands would indicate that the Soviet
government approves of citizens making demands on the government. Indeed, this may be one way in which citizen participation is encouraged.
Satisfaction of such personal demands would serve the Liberal system maintaining function of institutionalizing citizen dissatisfaction and distributing
small quantities of resources in order to maintain the systemic status quo
without complaint.
IV

Legislative representation may also take place through legislative oversight of the bureaucracy. The Soviet Constitution makes reference to an
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oversight function for the Supreme Soviet.
"The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities
elect from among the deputies standing commissions for
the preliminary consideration and preparation of questions within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR and its Presidium, and the supervision of the
activities of the state organs and organizations. " 34
"The Supreme Soviet of the USSR supervises the activities to all state organs accountable to it." 35
Lower level soviets are also given powers of oversight. These powers
are specifically spelled out in Chapters 12 and 15 of the Constituti on of the
USSR. In these chapters, the operation of the soviets and the functions of
their ·deputies are stated. 36
While an oversight function may exist in theory, there is no guarantee
that this is the case in reality. I believe that there is some evidence that
theory and reality do converge on the issue of oversight.
Table 3
The USSR Supreme SovMt:
S1aadins Commissions, 1954-1979

Num~r of Mtttln1s fH' Convocalfon
Commlulon (date
of touadallon)

4th
(195'-58)

5th
(1951-62)

6tb
(1962-66)

7th
(1966-70)

Lc&islativcproposaJs(1938)
International affairs (1938)

l<b
(1970-74)

9tll
(1974-7' )

15
10

Plannina-budaet(1938)'
Mandates (1938)
Economic(Council or Nau)
(1957-66)
Industry (1966)1>
Trari.sportand Communications
(1966)'
Constructionand buildina

matcriaJsindustry (1966)
Agriculture (1966)
CommunaJeconomyand

services ( 1966)
Health and social $CCUfily(1966)

Education,scienceand
technology ( 1966)c
Youth (1968)
Conservuion or nalurc and
rational useor natural
resources( 1970)

Consumer goodJ (1974)
Women's work and social

conditions (1976)

Joint sessions
T01al

0

2

4

IS

19

21

18

22

25

65

83

98

'Budget commission until 19.57.
bScparatcdin 1970.
eScparatedin 1919into educa1ionand cultural and sclenct and technology commissions.
Source: V«Jomosti Vtrkhovnoio Sovtta SSSR, 1954-1919.
(From White, J980;259)

Table 3 indicates that two interesting phenomena have occurr ed since
1954. First, the number of standing commissions has increased dramatically,
particularly since 1966. Second, the number of meetings that these commissions have held has also increased. Those commissions that have existed
since 1954 have met with more frequency particularly since 1966. 38
If these commissions were merely rubber-stamps with no real oversight
authority, there would be no reason to increase either their numbers or the
frequency with which they meet. If these commissions performed nothing
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rnore th an symboli c duti es with in the Supr eme Sovi et, th ere would be no
need to main tain th em at an yth ing abo ve a symboli c level. Th e numb er o f
functio ns that a standing co mm ission could be expe cted to engage in is
rather limited. Two of the more ob viou s activiti es ar e legislat ive initia tive
and ove rsight. There is no evidence to sugge st that these commi ssion s
engage in the formulation of legislat ion .
Table•
Tbt U R 11pmat So•~ :
Chartctr.rtsOa o f Otpulla, 1937- 1979
(In pc:rttat11 tt)
Party Mtmbfft
(:oavocti l io ■

ISi ( 1937-46)
2nd ( 1946-lO)
3rd( l9 ~ l4)
41h ( 19l4- l8)
l th ( 19l 8-62)
6th (1962-66)
7th ( 1966-70)
8th ( 1970- 74)
91h ( 1974- 90)
10th (1979- 14)

Wome■

16.l
20.7
21.l
25.8
26.6
27.0
28.0
JO.l
31,3
32.l

aad Caadldat a:

76. 1
81.0
U .l
78.0
76. 1
7l .8
7l .2
12.2
12.2
11.1

£J/"ca1lon

Aft

To JO

J I...O

47.8

2A.9
10. 1
6.l
8.2

Jl .8
2A.8
19.2
21.8
28. 1
28.6
2J .O
18.l
n.d .

1.1
14.l
12.0
18.l
18.4
21.1

,1 . 50

21.0
41.l
49.9
44 .4
40.l
JO. I
21.1
2l .l
28. 1
n .d

51...0

60 +

4,l
8.7
14.l
2J .6
2l .2
22.9
25.4
21.7
21.8
n .d

1.8
4. 1
4,J
4.6
4 .8

...

6.3
11.3
13.2
n .d .

Hlahu
21.4

38.8
46 .4
ll .4
48.7
l2 .7
l3 .3
ll.4
l3 .0
n.d.

Stto ■ dary

PrimU')'

J0.9
29.4
28.2
26.9
32.0
36.8
40.8
46. 1
46.0

47.7
32. 1
25.4
17.7
19.3
10 .l
l.9
2.l
1.0
n.d.

n.d.
Sourcc:s:Vtrkhovn yl Solltt SSSR devyo1010 SOty\<IO
(SIOIISlk hak ii sbornik ), pp. 46-.SI; VHomost l Vtrkhow,010 Sowttl SSSR , no. 11{14 March,
1979), p. 171.
(From White; 2.SI)

Table 4 indicates that there ha s been a steady drop in the per centage of
Supre me Soviet deputies holding only primary education s. There also seems
to have been an attempt to maintain the Supreme Soviet member ship at approxi mately 50% above the secondary education level. While thi s tells us
nothi ng about oversight in and of itself, it is reasonable to conclude that
oversi ght could not effectiv ely take place without legislator s who are com peten t to understand technically complex information .
Tabk S

R~l« tlon by £d11cotlon
Lrnlof

196' So•~
(II)

Primary only

82

Secondary•

600

Hiah.,.j

Il l

12
IJO
481

14.6
21.7
l7 .9

•1nc:lud.lnaincomplete secondary
flnc:ludina incomplete:tuahc:r.
(From Hill, 1972;52)

Table 5 indicates that between 1966 and 1972, the least frequently
reelected group of deputies held only primary educations. Those with po stsecondary educations on the other hand were the most frequently reelected
member s of the Supreme Soviet. While this does not provide enough informati on to determine long-term trends, it may indicate some support for the
hypothesis that educational credentials are becoming more important
within the Supreme Soviet.
The reelection of those members of the Supreme Soviet who have better education s may be further indicative of the oversight role played by the
Supre me Soviet. It is difficult to learn the informal rules of any organization . In the legislative context, mastering these rule s can be crucial to one's
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success. Those who serve in the Supreme Soviet for only one term are less
likely to have the opportunity to learn how to perform their jobs effectiv ely.
By preventing the reelection of those with only primary educatio ns, the
Soviet political system widens the gap of relative effectiveness betw een the
well educated and the poorly educated.
I believe that the oversight function has been sanctioned by the Soviet
political system, and has not become more prominent merely as the res ult of
better educated deputies seeking to use their skills. The CPSU decides which
individuals will appear on the ballot on election day, and hence must approve those individuals with higher levels of education. If these deputie s
were found to be a difficulty for the system, people of their backg round
would not be sought after.

Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate that legislative repr esentation is a legitimate activity in the USSR and that it is accomp lished , at
least partially, through constituency-service
and oversig ht of the
bureaucracy.
While the information available is probably not sufficient to pro vide
conclusive evidence for the above hypothesis, it is strongly supportive o f it.
While the circumstances under which survey data was collected cannot be
examined for methodological rigor, the information available fro m these
surveys seems to support the hypotheses of this paper.
The existence of an oversight function is more reliant on infe rential
data than is the argument concerning the existence of a constituency service
function at the local level. However, I believe that the argument prese nted
in support of the Supreme Soviet's oversight function is plausible. In order
for this element of the Soviet legislative process to be better underst ood, researchers must devise a method for determining what occurs qua litative ly in
the standing commissions. The conclusions that have been reache d thu s far
have made the functionalist assumption that if the number of stan ding commissions and their meetings are increasing, something must be being accomplished. Such a conclusion is inferential rather than direct, and not
necessarily definitive.
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